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Summary 
We currently observe a renaissance of the debate about a 
multilateral investment agreement (MIA). The last attempts 
to establish such an agreement failed in 1998 at the Organi-
sation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
and in 2003, as part of the Doha Development Agenda of 
the World Trade Organization (WTO). The reasons for these 
failures are both the resistance of emerging countries and 
developing countries to one-sided policies mainly aimed at 
protecting international investors, and divergences among 
industrialised countries, particularly regarding the liberalisa-
tion of market access regulations. 
The proponents name several arguments in favour of a 
resumption of negotiations about an MIA: 
First, we can now observe a fundamental shift in global 
investment flows. Companies from emerging countries are 
increasingly investing abroad and aim at a better protection 
of their foreign direct investment (FDI) in developing and 
industrialised countries. The traditional criticism put forward 
by influential, emerging countries against an MIA appears to 
be weakening as the result of a growing convergence of 
interests. 
Secondly, among industrialised countries themselves there is 
a growing consensus regarding international investment 
rules. One sign of this are the Shared Principles for Inter 
national Investment, adopted in 2012 by the EU and the 
U.S.A., whose purpose is to smooth the way for a Transatlan-
tic Trade and Investment Partnership. With this gradual con-
vergence, in particular regarding the inclusion of market 
access provisions, a further stumbling block along the way to 
an MIA appears to have been done away with. 
Thirdly, the increasing regionalisation of investment rule-
making is advanced as an argument which can facilitate the 
leap to the next-higher, multilateral level. As a result of so-
called "Mega-Regionals"  like the Transpacific Partnership 
between the U.S.A. and 10 other countries in the Pacific 
Region, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership 
between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) and six other countries, including China or the 
planned Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership   it 
is possible that a consolidation of investment rules will 
arise which would simplify the negotiations about an MIA. 
These current trends can in fact help to smooth the path to a 
global accord. However, the main question driving the inter-
national debate should not be whether it is possible to estab-
lish an MIA. What is more important is the question whether 
the institutional form of an MIA is suitable for effectively 
solving the most pressing challenges in the current invest-
ment regime. This is not very likely, since an MIA is unlikely to 
lead to significantly more FDI flows or to give stronger con-
sideration to the interests of the developing countries. An 
MIA will most likely also not lead to greater coherency be-
tween the investment rules and other policy areas. 
It is more promising to tackle these challenges in the context 
of regional co-operation, since this permits better accom-
modation of the treaty contents to the specific needs of the 
countries involved. Negotiations at the regional level should 
be supplemented by co-ordination efforts on the global 
level. The G-20 is the appropriate orchestrator for talks about 
these systemic questions, talks which in turn should be 
carried on with the inclusion of the OECD, WTO, and the 
United Nations Conference for Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) and other stakeholders. 
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Deficits of the current investment regime 
In contrast to world trade, no comprehensive multilateral 
accord exists for investments. Global investment flows are 
protected by a fragmented system of more than 2,800 
bilateral investment agreements and 300 free trade agree-
ments with investment chapters. Most of these agree-
ments establish far-reaching and binding standards of 
protection for international investors, such as national 
treatment, fair and equitable treatment, and liberal finan-
cial transfer clauses. Among the essential features of inter-
national investment agreements (IIAs) is that investors can 
assert their rights against host counties directly before 
transnational arbitration tribunals. 
In recent years, a lively debate has developed about the 
economic and social effects of IIAs and about the limits 
imposed on host countries’ policy space by IIAs, a debate in 
which the following critical arguments are advanced: 
Firstly, the effectiveness of IIAs as an instrument for pro-
moting investment flows is called into question, even 
though some econometric studies show a generally posi-
tive influence of IIAs on FDI flows. However, IIAs which 
provide greater legal protection to international investors 
have no significantly greater impact on the volume of FDI 
flows than "weaker" agreements. In addition, company 
surveys have shown that IIAs play only a minor role in the 
investment decisions of many investors. Only free trade 
agreements with investment chapters which simultane-
ously liberalise market access for investors can significantly 
increase FDI inflows. Finally, IIAs are only one determinant 
among many which affect the volume of FDI inflows. 
Secondly, the critics advance the argument that IIAs greatly 
limit host countries’ policy space for regulating FDI. On the 
one hand, this effect is intended as a means of attracting 
FDI. Host countries hope to signal international investors 
via IIAs that their respective national investment regimes 
are open and reliable. On the other hand, the very rapidly 
rising number of investor-state dispute settlement proce-
dures is a sign of the restrictive influence of IIAs, which in 
turn was never intended by the parties to such agreements. 
In particular, IIA-specific clauses like the sweeping require-
ment of fair and equitable treatment make it possible for 
investors to go to court against a broad range of host 
country measures. It is not least due to the legal actions 
taken by international investors against the health- and 
environment-related measures of governments that the 
restrictive influence of IIAs is criticised. 
A further point of criticism against the current investment 
regime and in particular the system of arbitration is the 
inconsistency of arbitration awards and the inconsistent 
interpretation of the protection standards contained in 
IIAs. As a reaction to these shortcomings, the countries of 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) have 
begun to formulate protection standards in their IIAs in 
greater detail and to increase their regulatory latitude by 
specifying exceptions. These reforms are being taken up by 
more and more countries. 
Finally, IIAs are also the target of criticism due to their impact 
on other policy areas. Traditionally, IIAs were entered into 
above all as instruments for promoting FDI, and were orient-
ed correspondingly in one-sided fashion to the protection of 
investors. This one-sided orientation is no longer suitable in 
view of a growing interconnectedness of different policy 
areas. The protection standards contained in IIAs intervene 
deeply in the national regulatory system of any host state, 
affecting not only investment-specific policies but also, as 
already mentioned above, a multitude of other areas subject 
to public regulations. IIAs which are all-too one-sided in their 
orientation towards the protection of investors can have an 
unduly restrictive effect on the ability of the host countries 
to act in other political arenas. 
Fig. 1: Number of bilateral IIAs and free trade agree-
 ments with investment chapters, 2000-2011 
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Fig. 2: Number of investor state dispute settlement 
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Against this background, the effectiveness and legitimacy 
of the current investment regime is being called into ques-
tion. One sign of this is not only the criticism of many non-
governmental organisations and such international organi-
sations as UNCTAD but also the reactions of many coun-
tries. Australia intends to negotiate IIAs in future only 
without investor state arbitration clauses. Latin American 
countries like Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela have already 
cancelled their membership in the International Centre for 
the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), which is 
affiliated with the World Bank, and South Africa intends to 
cancel its IIAs with European countries. These developments 
are signs of an erosion of the current investment regime. 
What can a multilateral investment agreement 
achieve? 
In analogy to the world trading system, argue the propo-
nents of an MIA, universal rules would be preferable in the 
area of investments too, due to the fragmentation of the 
system of more than 3,000 bilateral accords (Aslund 2013). 
However, it appears doubtful whether the integration of 
trade and investment policies will have comparable eco-
nomic effects. Irrespective of its normative permeating 
force, the multilateral logic does not apply automatically to 
the dismantling of non-tariff barriers. The World Trade 
Report 2011 shows that "deep integration" within the 
framework of bilateral or regional accords  for example 
regarding the dismantling of technical trade barriers or the 
liberalisation of services  often has no discriminating 
effect on third parties (WTO 2011). Non-members cannot 
easily be excluded from the benefits of this integration. 
The same holds true for investment policies as well. For the 
benefits of bilateral IIAs are not necessarily concomitant with 
negative effects on non-members. Among the special fea-
tures of IIAs are, for example, most-favoured nation clauses, 
which explicitly extend the benefits of bilateral integration 
steps to non-members as well. In view of the wide-ranging 
overlaps and structural connections we indeed already have 
a multilateral investment system, but one which is consti-
tuted above all by a fragmented and complex network of 
bilateral accords (Schill 2009). This co-operative fragmenta-
tion must not necessarily involve negative consequences for 
the system as a whole. 
In view of the non-discriminatory nature of the current 
investment regime, it is to be doubted that an MIA can 
help meet the three challenges described at the beginning. 
Would an MIA lead to an increase in FDI inflows? The propo-
nents of an MIA argue correctly that the bilateralisation of 
rules of investment only promotes lack of transparency and 
higher complexity, thus leading to elevated transaction 
costs for international investors. Irregardless of the already-
described systemic overlaps of bilateral IIAs, they differ 
from one another in detail and make it difficult for  
international investors to evaluate the existing legal 
framework for investment. An MIA could therefore result 
in more investment flows, especially since the signal effect 
of a multilateral accord would be greater than the multi-
tude of individual accords. 
However, the positive effect of an MIA due to the lowering 
of transaction costs depends on whether a multilateral 
accord would supplant the bilateral IIAs among the mem-
bers. Developments in the world trading system, which is 
characterised by the simultaneity of multilateral, regional 
and bilateral integration, makes such a sea change appear 
doubtful. An MIA would thus merely add another level of 
regulation, and opacity and complexity would only be 
increased even further. 
Would an MIA bolster the bargaining power of developing 
countries and take regulatory aspects more into account? As 
described at the beginning, IIAs are for the most part one-
sided in their orientation to the protection of international 
investors. One argument advanced for an MIA is that of the 
dismantling of power asymmetries between industrialised 
and developing countries. A comparison with negotiations 
in the WTO or the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change shows that by forming coalitions de-
veloping countries are quite capable of having a decisive 
impact on the course of multilateral negotiations. Howev-
er, should the developing countries prevail and succeed in 
anchoring exceptions to the regulation of FDI and the 
accountability of investors in an MIA, it would be equiva-
lent to a Pyrrhic victory: capital-exporting industrialised 
countries (and emerging countries) would pull back from 
the multilateral negotiations and would again concentrate 
on negotiating bilateral or regional accords. 
Could the coherency of rules of investment be improved in the 
context of MIA-negotiations? On the one hand, the issue 
here is to take into account previously neglected issues 
such as the negative effects of host countries’ investment 
incentives or investments of state-owned companies. On 
the other, the aim would be to reduce the potentially neg-
ative impact of investment rules on other policy areas such 
as international financial and trade policies, or health and 
environmental policies. It appears doubtful that a stand-
alone MIA which only addresses investment rules would 
improve the coherency of the current investment regime. 
Finally, one fundamental question also remains open: in 
what forum could an MIA be negotiated? The WTO is ad-
vanced by proponents of an MIA as an appropriate plat-
form for negotiating rules of investment. However, the 
WTO currently finds itself in a deep crisis which makes it 
impossible for it in the short or medium term to assume 
responsibility for new policy areas such as investment. In 
addition, other forums for negotiation such as the OECD or 
UNCTAD are automatically excluded because they are 
allied too closely with the interests of already industrialised 
or emerging and developing countries. 
Act regionally, co-ordinate globally 
The shortcomings of the current investment regime can be 
better dealt with in the context of regional negotiations; 
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these should, however, be accompanied by a political dia-
logue on the global level. 
The regionalisation of investment rule-making is already in 
full swing and has reached a new level with the negotia-
tions of "Mega-Regionals" such as the Transpacific Partner-
ship, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, or 
the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. These 
regionalisation processes are significant not only because 
of the high volume of trade and investment flows which 
are affected. Also important is the impact of these integra-
tion processes on the framework of future international 
investment policies. The U.S.A. and the EU, for example, 
have expressed the aim that a transatlantic accord shall 
establish the standards for future investment rules. 
One benefit of these regionalisation processes is the inte-
gration of rules of investment into the context of a free 
trade agreement. These so-called WTO-plus accords en-
compass not only trade in goods but also such areas as 
services, the rights to intellectual property, competition, 
investments, and sustainability. These accords either go 
beyond the level of regulations agreed on in the WTO or 
open up fully new fields of regulation. This integration of 
different contents of regulations within a process of nego-
tiation corresponds not only to real economic developments 
like the spread of global value chains. These accords also 
include for the most part environmental or labour rules. 
In addition, current research findings show that free trade 
agreements with investment chapters, in comparison to 
stand-alone bilateral IIAs, stimulate more FDI flows. In 
addition, one may expect it to be easier within the frame-
work of regional negotiations to arrive at a consensus 
regarding the above-described contents of regulations 
than in multilateral negotiations. 
 
 
 
 
It is naturally the case that regional negotiations are no pana-
cea for processing the shortcomings of the current investment 
regime. In particular, it must be ensured that these highly 
complex WTO-plus accords do not result in a creeping discrim-
ination against developing countries. In addition to measures 
for increasing the negotiation capacities of developing coun-
tries there is therefore need of an accompanying process of co-
ordination on the global level. This should lead to a better 
understanding between the traditional, capital-exporting, 
industrialised countries, the emerging countries, whose com-
panies are increasingly investing abroad, and the developing 
countries, which often continue to be cut off from global 
investment flows. 
The G-20 is the natural candidate to be the initiator of a 
concomitant process of coordination. The G-20 comprises 
not only the industrialised countries but also the most 
important of the emerging countries and takes into ac-
count – even though inadequately up to now – the inter-
ests of the developing countries via the participation of 
regional organisations such as the African Union. Orches-
trated by the G-20, these discussions should be conducted 
with the inclusion of international organisations like the 
OECD, the WTO, and UNCTAD, along with that of business 
and civil society stakeholders. 
The discussions should include new topics that have not been 
dealt with in IIAs. In particular, the discussions should include 
the balance between liberalisation and regulation of invest-
ment policies, the financial incentives of host countries, the 
investments of state-owned companies, the integration of 
voluntary sustainability standards, and the consolidation of 
the existing system of bilateral IIAs. In view of the current 
dynamic changes in the investment, these processes should 
be set in motion as quickly as possible. 
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